Saizen REIT: AGM on 19 Oct 10.

I managed to take leave from work to attend Saizen REIT's AGM with a friend today. The AGM started on time and there were few surprises for me as I have been tracking this REIT for about a year now. Nonetheless, I picked up some interesting points which might not be apparent from the presentation slides.

The management took pains to impress upon unitholders that even if YK Shintoku were to suffer a foreclosure, the rest of Saizen REIT would not be affected. The DPU of 0.26c for the months of May and June 2010 did not have any contribution from YK Shintoku. We could expect this DPU to be sustainable. So, even if YK Shintoku's loan remains unresolved, we could expect a DPU of 0.26c x 6 = 1.56c per annum, ceteris paribus.  This is a yield of almost 10% based on a unit price of 16c.  However, I would expect this to be diluted somewhat if all the warrants are exercised. A 7% yield could be more realistic then.  When we take into consideration that Saizen REIT owns freehold properties, this becomes quite attractive.

Depending on whether YK Shintoku's CMBS is refinanced and the size of its portfolio at the point in time if refinancing happens, yield would be adjusted upwards but the magnitude of such an adjustment would remain guesswork for now, at best.

The management's energy is now focused on the re-financing of YK Shintoku's CMBS. The main difficulty in getting the loan re-financed is the cautious stance of lenders. This explains why they are gradually divesting properties in YK Shintoku to lower the absolute quantum of the loan. This is a preferred alternative to having the portfolio foreclosed by the CMBS holders.

A smaller loan quantum would also make it more palatable to potential lenders, of course. In fact, Mr. Raymond Wong mentioned that a bank in Tokyo is willing to lend them more money provided that they resolve the YK Shintoku CMBS first. A chicken and egg problem, it seems.

Mr. Wong further revealed that in the last two years or so, they met up with about 60 different banks and managed to refinance all but YK Shintoku 's CMBS. The absolute size of this CMBS remains a challenge although it has been reduced through divestment of properties over time from the original JPY 7.953 billion to the current JPY 5.9 billion. It was also said that YK Shintoku has a cash reserve of JPY 0.6 billion which would reduce the outstanding loan balance to JPY 5.3 billion.

The problem with CMBS is that it has to be fully repaid and there is no amortising feature. So, the challenge is now to find a lender willing to lend JPY 5.3 billion to refinance YK Shintoku's CMBS.

The management revealed that it collected $14.56 m from warrant proceeds as of 18 Oct. Potentially, it could receive another $30.18m if the rest of the warrants are exercised. If enough properties from YK Shintoku were divested to make the outstanding loan balance payable using warrant proceeds, we might not even need to refinance the loan. JPY 5.3 billion is (at today's rate of 1 JPY = 0.01575 SGD) equivalent to S$83.475m.  For such an option to work, it seems that Saizen REIT would have to divest another $40m worth of properties from YK Shintoku's portfolio.

Both Mr. Raymond Wong and Mr. Chang Sean Pey agreed that it is not the best time to sell properties in Japan. In fact, it is a time to buy properties in Japan (which could explain partially why GLP and MLT bought so many properties this year in the country). Unfortunately, the lack of willing lenders for YK Shintoku's refinancing bid leaves them little choice but to continue divesting properties until a time when it is no longer necessary. Like Mr. Wong said, it beats having the portfolio foreclosed.

The successful refinancing or discharging of YK Shintoku's CMBS would represent a bonus for unit holders since it would resume contribution to the REIT's distributable income. This is not, by any means, certain. Therefore, I would not buy Saizen REIT with this as the primary motivation. It is just a bonus that could very well materialise.

The management's tact to present the REIT as a safe income generating instrument was not lost on me. However, some unitholders were clearly not impressed and asked if there were plans to have greater coverage of Saizen REIT by brokerages and whether there would be further re-rating upwards by Moody's. It is a fact that Saizen REIT's units are trading at a huge discount to NAV and the yield is very high.  This was explained by Mr. Raymond Wong, quite candidly, because of the market's perception of the REIT which has remained unfavourable as well as the negative perception of the Japanese economy as a whole.

Having said this, understanding the need to have increased coverage for Saizen REIT, the management has met up with the largest retail brokerage in Singapore yesterday and will conduct a briefing for analysts today. Of course, positive coverage could give Saizen REIT's unit price a shot in the arm.  After all, it remains a strong value proposition.

Mr. Chang made a very good point that the depressed value of Japanese residential real estate is not because rental rates have plunged. Rental rates have remained relatively stable. It is because liquidity has dried up but this is slowly changing. The recent successful divestment of various properties in YK Shintoku shows that buyers are back and liquidity is returning. Things could only get better from here, in my opinion.

So, was there anything I did not like about the AGM? Resolutions 3 and 4: Allowing the manager to make or grant convertible instruments and to issue by way of placement at a discount of 10 to 20% of the unit price at the point in time. Although Mr. Raymond Wong assured unitholders that it is a formality and that they would not do any placements at such a steep discount to the current very depressed unit price, I voted against these resolutions.  I do not like share placements as they exclude small investors like me from taking part in the enlarged capital base.  I much prefer a rights issue.

In general, I enjoyed the AGM. Both Mr. Raymond Wong and Mr. Chang Sean Pey were polite and shared information freely. They answered questions candidly, acknowledging the difficult circumstances surrounding their efforts to refinance YK Shintoku's CMBS. Mr Arnold Ip, the Chairman, whom I have always imagined to be a Chinese gentleman but turned out to be Eurasian, said that they are now a lot more optimistic about the REIT and its future when, only a year ago, they were thinking of the worst case scenario.

After attending the AGM, I am more convinced than ever that Saizen REIT is a value proposition that is hard to ignore.  It is an income instrument that would continue to deliver a relatively high yield at the current price and the potential upside is more than any potential downside. I would continue to accumulate on weakness, if the opportunity presents itself.

AGM presentation slides here.

Related post:
Saizen REIT: Divestment of 3 properties.
Saizen REIT's properties: Would I buy?
Saizen REIT: Better than expected DPU.

Japanese Yen at 15 year high.

I have been following news reporting on the strength of the Japanese Yen as well as the actions taken by Prime Minister Naoto Kan's team.  I am, naturally, very interested in economic and financial news from the Land of the Rising Sun as I am vested in Saizen REIT.

I applaud Bank of Japan's (BOJ) decision to cut its interest rate to zero recently.  This would, in theory, make credit cheaper and more readily available in the country. This would encourage borrowing and could possibly give the economy a shot in the arm. However, taking note that the interest rate was near zero to begin with (at 0.1%), cutting its rate to zero could have limited positive effects.

For investors in Saizen REIT, a strong Yen is good because we receive income distributions in S$. However, a strong Yen is not good for Japan as, being an exporting economy, a strong Yen reduces Japanese companies' competitiveness. As Japanese MNCs repatriate earnings back to Japan, a stronger Yen reduces the value of repatriated earnings. A stronger Yen could also propagate the deflationary spiral which Japan is suffering from.

While, as investors in Saizen REIT, we want to have a strong Japanese Yen, we want it strong enough to give us good returns (i.e. an attractive yield on our investment) but we do not want it so strong as to jeopardise the well being of the Japanese economy as that would, in time, have negative ramifications for Japanese residential real estate.

Latest update:
The dollar was trading at 82.36 yen in Tokyo midday.
08 October 2010 1231 hrs, CNA.

Related post:
Japan's debt issue and Saizen REIT.

Buying gold? Wait for a correction.

Jim Rogers predicts "more turmoil" in the currency markets, more problems in the stock market, weakness in bonds and, ultimately, inflation.

 
Posted Oct 06, 2010 07:30am EDT by Aaron Task

"Gold could correct for a few months [but] the bull market in gold is not over - far from it," he says. "I'm much more bullish on agriculture than I am even on gold. I own both."

In the meantime, he owns the Swiss franc, euro and yen but is not actively short any currencies, including the greenback.

In case of a correction, I see immediate support at US$1,250 an ounce, followed by US$1,200 an ounce.

Related post:
Gold can double from here over the next 5 years.

Hope this helps to refresh your "A" Level Economics!

The title of this blog post is exactly the same as the title of an email sent to me by a reader, Paul.  I like how it neatly encapsulates his good intention with a dash of cheekiness. I try not to take myself too seriously most of the time. Haha... I have reproduced his email with his permission:

Ways to Boost National Income

As we have learnt in basic economic theory, C+I+G+(X-M)=Y, I will now discuss issues which are restricting the major economies such as US and the EU to grow, and some of the policies which have been undertaken by them.

C stands for domestic consumption. In recessions, consumption is usually hit badly. As the consumers are busy deleveraging to pay off their debts, they cut down on their income elastic consumption which is normally the luxury goods.

I stands for investments, aka private sector. During recessions, there is a lack of incentives for investment by the private sector due to excess capacity therein. Furthermore, margins could thin due to lack of pricing power in times of recession. In addition, due to consumers deleveraging, there could be a lack of demand from consumers.

G stands for government spending. In normal recessions, a country's government is able to execute expansionary fiscal policies through spending in sectors such as infrastructure, education, health or military. These deficits could be financed by previous budget surpluses (which many of these big countries do not have), or borrowings through issuance of government bonds. Most countries adopt the issuance of government bonds approach to finance their government spending. However, as mentioned in an earlier post, governments in major economics like the UK, Japan and the USA have been incurring budget deficits for the past few years, which limit their ability to borrow more money. In the case of the US, the government debt is expected to double over the next decades, with majority of the debt caused by interest payment. The austerity program adopted by the major economies limit the governments' ability to prop up growth.

(X-M) is net export. One of the most basic ways to boost the (X-M) component is to have a weaker currency, which would make a country's exports relatively cheaper compared to other countries. Currently, governments worldwide are turning to this as a solution. Instead of focusing on productivity to boost exports, governments take the easy way out, by “manipulating” the strength of their currencies. For example, USA forced the revaluation of the Japanese Yen in 1985 to boost their exports. Currently, USA is trying to do the same to the Chinese RMB.

In this world, there is never a case of a balanced trade accounts, there will always be imbalances, some countries having surpluses, some having deficits. Trade account surpluses and deficits are not a problem in economic studies. But for political reasons, it has been a problem. Recently, Japan central bank also intervened in the FOREX market to weaken the yen. This has led to what is called "competitive devaluation", a race to the bottom, where countries will try to make their currencies relatively weaker to boost exports.

Another method to boost (X-M) is the implementation of trade barriers, which would again result in trade wars. Already, there are signs of protectionist measures in the USA through the “Buy Made in US” campaign. Trade wars would hamper global economic growth, especially those of emerging markets which are reliant on exports.

When there is a recession caused by a financial crisis, it takes longer than usual to recover due to the freeze in credit lines and financial system. Actually, US is doing comparatively better than the recovery from previous financial crisis led recession.

In the case of Singapore, we are fortunate enough to have a good public financial system. Any sales of Singapore assets such as land are being kept in the “treasury” under the care of the President and not the government. 50% of the returns from investments such as those from GICs are also channeled into this “treasury”.

Hence, when the Singapore government want to tap into this reserve in 2008 or 2009, it had to seek permission from the President. The budget surpluses which are usually stated by the government, do not include the increase in the reserve funds. Therefore, “short term pain, long term gain” has served Singapore well in saving for the rainy days and having the fiscal policies to help the economy. Most western economies do not have this privilege due to the asymmetrical nature of fiscal policies. Easy to cut taxes, hard to raise taxes, which sort of validate Singapore government's stand on retaining the GST even during the economic hard times.

Related post:
USA, a rock and a hard place: Paul opines.

Japan's debt issue and Saizen REIT.

On 15 Feb, a reader, Robin Lim commented, "I read yr comments about saizen and they are good. But i hv always been concerned about japan's debt/gdp. An article in Forbes Feb issue p62 "Blowup" explained it well. Be careful about Japanese property, because it can be a Greece."

When I returned to Singapore on 17 Feb, I responded, "Japan does have a debt problem but we have to remember that Japan is not only a borrower, it is also a lender. Japan is the second largest lender to the USA. China is of course the largest.


"I have not read the article in Forbes but did they look at debt as a percentage of GDP only? Another way of looking at this is debt per capita. In this respect, Greece is number one in the world at US$ 27,746. USA is 11th at US$ 11,094. Japan does not even come close."

Apparently, Japan is now the largest holder of US Treasury debt as China cut back its exposure in December 2009.  This was revealed last Tuesday by the US Treasury Dept.



This is one factor which sets Japan apart from Greece.  Japan is also a lender, not just a borrower.  When we look at debt, it is important not to just look at gross debt (ie. the total amount borrowed), we should look at net debt which takes into consideration the borrower's status as a lender.  Japan is one of the largest creditor nations in the world.

Also, as Japan is home to many renowned MNCs, a more accurate picture of Japanese debt situation should compare its net debt to GNP, instead of GDP.  Japanese MNCs repatriate earnings from their global operations back to Japan and GNP is a much bigger figure than GDP.

Interestingly, much of Japan's debt is in local hands.  Less than 10% of Japanese debt is funded by foreign bodies.  This is largely due to the fact that the Japanese people have been such big savers.  In contrast, American national debt is, to a large extent, in foreign hands.

Having said all these, I am not glossing over Japan's debt issue which still has to be dealt with.  Borrowings have to be repaid.  An ageing population puts into question the sustainability of Japan's national debt as well. 

There are some difficult decisions which the government must make and as Japan is still the largest economy in Asia, we should all be very concerned whether any progress is made over time.

I am not a politician or some big shot in a global organisation like the Asian Development Bank or the World Bank.  There is nothing I could do about this, obviously.  The question which might be on your mind now is, "How will this affect Saizen REIT?"

I do not see the debt situation in Japan becoming unmanageable in the next few years.  As the Japanese population ages over the next decade, they will start cashing out of government bonds.  The Japanese government might have to sell US Treasury debt gradually then unless it is able to trim expenditure in a meaningful way or get its economy to grow more robustly in time.  As you can imagine, all these will most likely not happen in, say, one or two years.  It's going to take far longer. 

Saizen REIT is still a most compelling buy in the near term and is still most attractive as a high yielding passive income generator over the next few years.