PREH is likely to continue trading at a big discount.

My experience with Perennial Real Estate Holdings (PREH) started from its days as Perennial China Retail Trust (PCRT).

PREH has a portfolio consisting mostly properties in China in terms of asset value (75%) and the balance being properties in Singapore.

Some numbers:

NAV/share= $1.68
Gearing= 0.45x
EPS=6.88c






At 90c a share, we are looking at a PE ratio of about 13x.

I believe that PREH is a long term value creator. 

The investment thesis is somewhat similar to that for CapitaMalls Asia which I had an investment in before. Similarly, PREH's Chinese investments will take time to deliver the goods. 





PREH is definitely not for the impatient investor. 

Although not comparable in many ways, for something similar in terms of gearing and EPS, the purist income investor might be more interested in Croesus Retail Trust (which holds Japanese commercial properties) and regular readers know that I have a significant investment in Croesus Retail Trust.

...

At the moment, I have a smallish exposure to PREH and I am likely to add to my position if its stock price should decline further.

I like PREH's longer term growth story and I am quite willing to wait for it to do better.

I bought into my investments in both OUE and Wing Tai Holdings at a 50% discount to NAV or more. 

So, I will probably add to my investment in PREH using the same yardstick.






Related posts:
1. Perennial Real Estate Holdings.
2. Perennial China Retail Trust.
3. Croesus Retail Trust.
4. CapitaMalls Asia.

AK anyhow picks 5 stocks for income investors.

UPDATE (January 2017):
"...with CRT no longer having an external trustee-manager, we believe this may remove a hurdle to a potential takeover by a J-REIT as speculated by some market participants due to CRT’s persistent high yield and discount to its NAV. " DBS Research.
Is Croesus Retail Trust an asset play that pays a good dividend while we wait? Sounds like Saizen REIT? Another Saizen REIT?
-----------------------------
Hi AK,
Thanks for your reply. :)
Rest assured I'm not trying to dig your portfolio value, rather, I have an planned/budgeted for a 5% yield on my portfolio returns and am not sure if this is something that is achievable or I might even be too conservative and should be aiming for something in the 7-8% range?


Hi,

7 to 8% yield is not unrealistic if we are invested in AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT, for example. ;)

Something higher? I-REIT and Croesus Retail Trust should do it.

If you don't like REITs and Biz Trusts, you can still get close to 4% yield (e.g. DBS) and 5% yield (e.g. SPH).

Best wishes,
AK

Note: 
AK is just throwing some ideas in the air. If they fall and hit your head, don't scold me. DYODD.

Related post:
1. AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT.
2. 1H 2016 income from S-REITs.
3. 1H 2016 income from non-REITs.

BREXIT and 1H 2016 income from non-REITs.

Were there any major development in the non-REIT space for me in 2Q 2016? 

Selling most of my investment in NeraTel probably qualifies. I sold about 90% of my investment in NeraTel. 

Being a relatively substantial part of my investment portfolio, the sale, as you might have guessed, bumped up the cash level in my portfolio by quite a bit.

A happy problem?

In the short term, with the divestment gains, it is probably a happy problem but if I do not put the money to more productive work, we would have to remove "happy" from the phrase. So, I put some of the money to work.

In the non-REIT space, in 1Q 2016, some readers might remember that I bought DBS, DBS and more DBS. Even now, DBS is trading at a discount to NAV and a relatively low PE ratio of about 8x. Paying out about a third of its earnings as dividends, the yield is almost 4%. 

Thanks to BREXIT, I was able to add to my investment in DBS as its share price declined, breaking a technical support. I would like to collect more on any further weakness.

In 2Q 2016, I also added to my investments in Starhub, VICOM, QAF Limited and Croesus Retail Trust on lower prices offered by Mr. Market.

Investing for income, I am interested in entities which have strong income generating abilities. Of course, they must pay meaningful dividends.


A handful of readers asked me for my thoughts on Croesus Retail Trust's proposal to be internally managed. It is quite interesting since it would be the first investment trust to be internally managed in Singapore if the deal is accepted by its unitholders.

All else remaining equal, internal management is a good thing for Croesus Retail Trust as it would mean that profits which would have gone to the external manager could be distributed to unitholders instead. The probability of conflict of interest between an internal manager and the unitholders will also be lower.

Of course, an external manager of any investment trust is a profitable enterprise, earning regular fees. No external manager in his right mind would give this up for a song. The price to internalise Croesus Retail Trust's manager is set at a princely sum of S$50 million.

For FY2015, the external manager recorded earnings of about S$500,000. Paying S$50 million to internalise the management would mean paying a PE ratio of 100x. Comparatively, ARA which manages a portfolio of REITs like Suntec REIT is trading at a PE ratio of about 15x. Go figure.

Although I like the idea of an internal manager for Croesus Retail Trust, I think paying S$50 million for this would be a price too high.

Post BREXIT, I also added to my investment in OUE Limited which I first blogged about in 2014 as a possible asset play. I basically paid 50c for what was worth $1.00. It was a smallish position as I was wary of the situation with Twin Peaks condominium. See my past analysis: here.

I decided to add to my investment because the situation with Twin Peaks has improved with many more units sold but the stock traded at an even bigger discount to NAV. While waiting for value to be unlocked, I will get some pocket money from the regular dividends OUE Limited declares.

Very much along the same line of thought, I decided to also increase my investment in Wing Tai Holdings. Although they have much more exposure to development properties compared to OUE, they have a stronger balance sheet. Mr. Market could be overly pessimistic. See my past analysis: here.

In 2Q 2016, I received income from:

1. APTT
2. ST Engineering
3. SPH 
4. PREH
5. QAF Limited
6. Wilmar
7. ARA
8. Hock Lian Seng
9. SCI
10. SMM
11. OUE Ltd
12. Hong Leong Finance
13. DBS
14. NeraTel
15. Accordia Golf Trust
16. Croesus Retail Trust
17. Starhub
18. Ascendas H-Trust


I hope I have not missed out anyone.

Total income received from non-REITs in 1H 2016:

S$ 58,545.01

That is about S$ 9,757.00 a month.

I will continue to nibble at stocks and if a correction in the magnitude of 10% or more should happen, I am prepared to buy much more.


Related posts:
1Q 2016 income from non-REITs.

1Q 2016 income from non-REITs.

This blog post almost did not get written. Thanks to this reader, it did:

"Hi AK,

"I read your blog on you first quarter income this year from reits. I am very inspired. I have been waiting for your blog on your first quarter income from non-reits. Please inspire me again. Many thanks!!"

Well, actually, I did receive a couple of emails before this asking me about what I did in the non-REITs space in 1Q 2016 but I really didn't do much. So, no blog post.

However, inspiring? Hmmm...

If blogging about my 1Q 2016 income from non-REITs will inspire more to think about investing for income to become more secure financially, OK.

Like I said, I didn't do much in 1Q 2016 in the non-REITs space.

Looking at my records, I bought DBS shares, DBS shares and more DBS shares as its share price plunged. The last time I bought any was at $13.45 a share in late February 2016.

In 1Q 2016, I received income from:

1. APTT
2. Tai Sin
3. Croesus Retail Trust

Fuji Grand Natalie inHatsukaichi City, Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan.

Total income received from non-REITs in 1Q: 

S$ 12,181.34

That works out to be about S$ 4,060.45 a month.

Of the 3 stocks, Croesus Retail Trust is my largest investment. It has also been rather busy 

See: 
Private Placement of 70,000,000 new units at 75c a unit. (March 2016)

See: 
Issuance of $60,000,000 5% fixed rate notes due 2020. (April 2016)

See: 
Completion of Acquisition of Fuji Grand Natalie. (April 2016)

As long as the management is able to make good use of the funds raised to improve DPU, I am happy. 

Most of the money raised in the private placement has gone to the acquisition of Fuji Grand Natalie (a freehold property that enjoys 100% occupancy) which was purchased at a 6% discount to valuation.

7 reasons to acquire Fuji Grand Natalie:

See: Presentation slides.

Seems to me that all is well, for now.

Investing for income is about investing in undervalued or fairly valued assets which are able to provide visible and meaningful income generation which should ideally be sustainable.

If AK can do it, so can you!

Related posts:
1. 2015 full year income from non-REITs.
2. 1Q 2016 income from S-REITs.

2015 full year income from non-REITs.

Before I reveal the numbers, let me talk to myself about what I did in 4Q 2015, investments wise.

I re-initiated a long position in ARA as I felt that its stock price declined to a reasonably attractive level. 

ARA's rights issue which followed not long after was unexpected but I took up my entitlement and applied for excess rights as I looked at it as an opportunity to buy more on the cheap. I will probably buy more if the stock declines further in price.

Of course, those who follow my blog will also remember another rights issue and that was by Croesus Retail Trust. I too participated fully in that rights issue.

A back of the envelope calculation shows that Croesus Retail Trust is now trading at a 10% distribution yield. 

Croesus Retail Trust has rather high gearing level but if we were to take that away, Croesus Retail Trust is actually still generating more than a 5% distribution yield (i.e. non-leveraged yield) which I think is very attractive for a portfolio of mostly freehold retail properties in Japan. 

As the Trust's unit price declined, I added to my position again in the middle of December at 78c a unit.

I also increased my investment in Accordia Golf Trust as its stock price declined. The last time I did this was in mid-December at 51c a unit.

Investing in Accordia Golf Trust, we must realise that weather plays an important part in its performance. So, we have to expect its revenue to fluctuate quite a bit seasonally, much like investing in hospitality REITs.

With sentiments pretty negative, if Mr. Market were to offer me meaningfully lower prices, I would probably be buying more.

I also did a bit of trading in 4Q 2015. I reduced my long positions in Wilmar and ST Engineering as their stock prices recovered. That gave me some trading gains for the quarter.

I don't trade very much anymore as it requires a bit more work. Now, I might not even look at the stock market for several days in a row.

I added to my long position again in ST Engineering as its stock price declined by more than 10% from my recent selling price. 


ST Engineering is still one investment for income and growth. I definitely want to buy more if Mr. Market goes into a depression.

For those who do not follow my comments section, I initiated a smallish long position in DBS. Some know that I have been thinking of buying into the three local banks for a while and have been waiting for their stock prices to become cheaper.

I chose DBS first because it was trading at the smallest premium to NAV compared to OCBC and UOB. There is also consensus that DBS would be the biggest beneficiary of rising interest rates.

I also added to my investment in SingTel as its stock price declined. We invest in SingTel, Starhub and M1 because they are defensive income generators but with SingTel, there is also a nice element of growth.

Finally, I added to my long position in APTT this month after having left it alone since its inception. The rapid plunge in APTT's unit price up till middle of December seemed excessive to me even though I have mentioned before that a DPU of 8c a year is unsustainable in the longer run.


A much lower DPU of between 4c to 5c would probably be more sustainable for APTT. So, adding to my long position at 63c a unit, I am expecting a more realistic distribution yield of 6.3% to 7.9%.


A more recent development was an expression of interest by a party to acquire Ascendas Hospitality Trust which I included in my income portfolio in 3Q 2014. I have added to my investment on a few occasions since then, as and when its unit price declined.

The last time I increased exposure to Ascendas Hospitality Trust was on 24 August 2015 at 58.5c a unit. With an estimated annual DPU of 5.5c, I was looking at a distribution yield of almost 10%.

Although I hope that the offer is going to be at a fairly attractive premium to valuation, I am aware that if the Trust should be taken private, my income from non-REITs next year would take a hit.

Very safe to show hand like this.

Including my first income distribution from Religare Health Trust (RHT), dividends from my investments in non-REITs in Q4 brings my income in 2015 from them to a grand total of S$76,804.69.

This works out to be about S$6,400.00 a month.

Including the distributions from S-REITs this year, I am pretty satisfied with the total income generated by my investment portfolio.


Related post:
1. ARA: Re-initiating long position.
2. Croesus Retail Trust: Rights.
3. Trading ST Engineering.
4. Religare Health Trust: Entered at 88c.
5. 9M 2015 income from non-REITs.

Croesus Retail Trust: 22 for 100 rights issue.

Some time ago, I mentioned that due to the relatively high gearing level, I expected further acquisitions made by Croesus Retail Trust to be funded through new equity or a blend of new equity and debt.

In their acquisition of another mall in Japan, Torius in Fukuoka, funds will be raised partially through a rights issue. 

Some details:

1. 114,222,677 Rights Units. 

2. Issue price of S$0.610 per Rights Unit.

3. 22 Rights Units for every 100 existing Units held.

I very much prefer a Rights issue to a share placement because the former allows all unit holders to participate. I also like Rights issues if the money is used to purchase good quality income producing assets which would lead to DPU accretion.

Based on the purchase price, the NPI yield of Torius is 7.8% while Croesus Retail Trust's portfolio's NPI yield is 5.3%. So, the purchase is NPI yield accretive. However, due to the enlarged float, post Rights issue, we would see only a slight increase in DPU.

By subscribing to the Rights, I am putting my trust in the management to extract more value from the property as they have hinted at AEIs and future positive rental reversions.

I will fully subscribe to my Rights entitlement at 61c per Rights Unit and I will also apply for excess Rights, as usual. If I am successful in getting some excess Rights, it would improve the distribution yield of my investment in the Trust.

During the one week or so when nil-paid Rights are being traded (9 Oct to 19 Oct), we could see some weakness in the Trust's unit price. That could be an opportunity to accumulate.

Also, if the nil-paid Rights are priced attractively, I could buy more. For example, if we think that, post acquisition and Rights issue, a fairly good unit price to pay for Croesus Retail Trust is 80c a unit, then, if the nil-paid Rights should trade at anything lower than 19c a piece, it could be a good deal (80c - 61c).

I certainly hope that this rights issue would present opportunities for me to add to my investment in Croesus Retail Trust at more attractive prices.

Read announcement: here.
See Press Release: here.
"Nil-paid" Rights trading period from 9 October 2015 to 19 October 2015. The closing date and time for subscription for Rights Units by Unitholders is 23 October 2015 at 5:00 p.m. (9.30 p.m. for Electronic Applications through ATMs of Participating Banks).

Related post:
Croesus Retail Trust: ONE'S MALL.

9M 2015 passive income from S-REITs.

The stock market has declined a fair bit in the last three months. For a while, there was some panic. Even now, there is probably a lingering sense of unease in the air.


We must know what to do when presented with a situation. Knowing what to do depends on our own set of circumstances and also motivations. 

Recently, a reader asked me if she should sell a stock which she said she bought at a much higher price some time ago. 

I asked her to consider if she would buy that stock now at the current price if she didn't buy it at a much higher price earlier.

We want to buy at a price we would not sell at and to sell at a price we would not buy at.

There isn't a universal right or wrong answer. At least I do not believe there is. We could each have an opinion on something's value or the lack of it.

Anyway, what have I done in the last three months?

In the last three months, in the S-REIT space, I added IREIT Global to my portfolio as its unit price declined. I like the properties the REIT holds but I thought its IPO price unattractive.

To own freehold office buildings in Germany, arguably the strongest economy in Europe, is an attractive idea. At the current unit price, an 8% distribution yield is achievable.

My initial investment in the REIT is not a big one. In fact, it is relatively small and probably gives me only a toehold.

IREIT Global's relatively high gearing level and the weak Euro are pertinent concerns. 

However, IREIT Global's loans are in Euros. So, they do have a natural currency hedge. This is unlike LMIR's situation. 

Having said this, I feel that the largest decline in the Euro against the S$ could well be behind us. The S$ has weakened considerably as well. 

My reasoning here is really similar to my earlier reasoning on how we shouldn't see much more weakness in the JPY against the S$ when considering whether to invest in Saizen REIT or Croesus Retail Trust.

I also added to my long position in Soilbuild REIT at the end of August, paying 75c per unit, having avoided adding to my position as the REIT's unit price rose to the mid 80s earlier.

I like the fact that the REIT benefits from the shifting of certain commercial activities from office buildings to business parks which form a relatively big percentage of its assets.

I believe that Soilbuild REIT and AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT are well managed industrial properties S-REITs. They will face challenges as the economy soften but they should be more resilient than office REITs which predominantly have office space in Singapore's CBD.

Next, I think it is probably timely to comment on a development which has been gaining momentum in the S-REIT space.

Many S-REITs have DRPs (or DRIPs), Distribution Re-investment Plan. Some readers asked me if I would take part in these plans. 

My answer is that I invest in S-REITs for income. So, I would usually take the cash distributions unless there is a chance to benefit from arbitrage which happened once before for AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT and some might remember that I blogged about it.

We must stay realistic. Remember that S-REITs' unit prices could come under pressure in the short term. What is short term? Maybe, the next one or two years.

Many S-REITs' unit prices have already declined somewhat in recent months. This is probably in response to interest rates which have risen because the S$ has weakened quite significantly against the US$.

When the US Fed finally moves to increase interest rate by, say, 0.25%, before the end of the year we might see a knee jerk reaction which could send S-REITs' unit prices lower as risk free rate rises.

Taking distributions in cash would give us more resources to take advantage of such a situation if it should come to pass.

I do not think that S-REITs' distribution yields would rise to the levels seen a few years ago during the Global Financial Crisis but the possibility that we could see yield expansion happening exists.

To be sure, there is really no need to be pessimistic. S-REITs remain relevant tools for income investors. They are not going to go kaput. We should try to stay pragmatic.

How much? Oh, sorry, I have been rambling.

Total income from S-REITs for first 9 months in 2015: S$73,139.35.

This works out to be S$8,126.59 per month.

Related post:

6M 2015 passive income from S-REITs.

An eye on Accordia Golf Trust, Croesus Retail Trust and Saizen REIT: 8.1 magnitude earthquake in Japan and the Yen.

On Vesak Day, a huge undersea earthquake was reported 874 kilometers from Tokyo. The epicentre was deep in the Pacific Ocean. Seismologists warned that another quake could be coming. See report here: Japan Today.

Expecting some negative reaction from Mr. Market, I looked at the prices of Accordia Golf Trust, Croesus Retail Trust and Saizen REIT this morning. Of the three, the unit price of Accordia Golf Trust retreated by almost 10%. It was a big decline but it probably had to do with the fact that the counter went XD as well.

Accordia Golf Trust announced their maiden DPU of 5.71c for the 8 months period since its date of listing. This included non-recurring gains. Based on the regular operation of the golf courses under management, it was estimated that full year DPU could come in at 6.23c. However, this was based on an exchange rate of S$1 to JPY 88.4. This was a couple of months ago.

Of course, the JPY has weakened significantly since then. The rate is now S$1 to JPY 92. This rate was last seen in late 2014 and could be the reason for the particular weakness in Accordia Golf Trust when the unit prices of both Croesus Retail Trust and Saizen REIT held up rather well. Accordia Golf Trust is, after all, the only one of the three that does not hedge currency risk and we must rightly expect DPU to reduce in S$ terms, therefore.

If we expect the DPU to reduce proportionally, we might see a revised full year DPU of 5.91c. Buying more at 71c to 72c a unit today means a distribution yield of 8.2% to 8.32%. If we need a minimum yield of 8% to make the investment worthwhile for us, then, based on the current weaker exchange rate, all else remaining equal, we should be able to accept a unit price of up to 74c or so. Coincidentally, this was the entry price of my current long position too.

Further weakness in the JPY cannot be discounted but I have made a case before on why I think the JPY's biggest declines are probably behind us. Getting into Accordia Golf Trust at its IPO was a bad idea for various reasons. At current prices, I believe that the business trust presents a decent enough investment for the income investor.

See an article in NextInsight on Accordia Golf Trust: here.

Related posts:
1. Accordia Golf Trust: Yield of 12.16%?
2. Croesus Retail Trust: ONE's MALL.
3. Saizen REIT: Deeply undervalued.

Overpaid for our investments in business trusts?

As investors, we do our best to look ahead but because we have imperfect knowledge, what we can see is probably just our best guess. Things are usually clearer on hindsight.

As income investors, we can be too concerned with yields sometimes and it does not help that certain consultants also put their focus on yields. To be fair, this is a common pitfall and I fell into such pits in my early days as well. However, consultants are professionals and, as a consequence, sometimes, they have a bit more reach. We should be more wary.

I do not have perfect knowledge. I am not a professional. I am just your average retail investor who has opened his fair share of cans of worms. I just share my thoughts and experience here in my blog but, remember, that they are not sacred in any way.

On 20 June 2014, I wrote a piece in response to a report which quoted a consultant as saying "If you want to invest in business trusts, you shouldn't be looking so much at capital gain... your objective is more dividend yield. Prices do come down, but you actually still get your dividend yield."

I took issue with that statement and listed 5 reminders to myself:

1. Dividend yield is a key factor, not the only key factor.

2. Keep an eye on possible capital gain or loss.

3. Look at yield on investment based on current price.

4. Could it be that we are taking back our own money?

5. Does the yield sufficiently compensate us for the risk?

To read the complete blog, refer to related post number 1 at the end of this blog.

Over the weekend, an article in The EDGE said:

"There is no doubt now that investors who bought shares in Hutchison Port Holdings Trust (HPH Trust) at its IPO four years ago paid Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing's corporate stable far too much."

I did not apply for shares in HPH Trust's IPO.

Actually, I have not applied for shares in any IPO for many years. I think avoiding IPOs has generally been more rewarding for me than not. So, this might be a good rule of thumb for me to stick to.

Similarly for Croesus Retail Trust's IPO, I avoided although I was interested and watched in disbelief as the unit price was chased to a high of $1.18. Its yield was being compressed so much as its price shot through the roof and some people still said it was attractive enough to buy. Did they know something I didn't? I wondered to myself, self-doubt settling in.

Well, this is just a short blog post to remind myself that REITs and business trusts are relevant tools for income investors and that there are many things to look out for, not just their distribution yields. Look at yields only and I could end up overpaying.

Related posts:
1. High yielding business trusts: A discussion.
2. HPH Trust: Storm clouds over a safe harbour.
3. Croesus Retail Trust: Motivations and risks.

2014 full year income from non-REITs.

This is the first time I am blogging about my full year income from investments in non-REITs. As my passive income generated from investments in S-REITs has for many years overshadowed income received from non-REITs, it wasn't very meaningful to blog about the latter.



Now that passive income received from S-REITs took a plunge, it has become more essential to talk to myself about what I have done in the non-REIT space which has shored up dividends received this year, making income contributions by non-REITs a more significant part of my total annual income from the stock market.


Before I continue, readers might want to bear in mind that a few of my investments in the non-REIT space have been with me for many years. They are not all new investments, therefore.

Anyway, non-REITs which have contributed to my passive income in 2014 are:

1. Croesus Retail Trust
2. Hock Lian Seng
3. Perennial China Retail Trust *
4. CapitaMalls Asia *
5. NeraTel
6. Wilmar
7. Yongnam
8. APTT
9. ST Engineering
10. SPH
11. QAF
12. Old Chang Kee
13. K-Green Trust *
14. SATS
15. Ascendas Hospitality Trust
16. Singapura Finance

* Sold and will not contribute any income in 2015.

New or old, I have blogged about all the above stocks before. So, if you should be interested in understanding why and when I invested in these stocks, just do a search for them in my blog and you will find the relevant blog posts.

Of these 16 stocks, I increased my long positions or initiated long positions in the last 12 to 15 months in Croesus Retail Trust, Hock Lian Seng, NeraTel, ST Engineering, SPH, SATS, Ascendas Hospitality Trust and Singapura Finance. 

Apart from Singapura Finance, it is quite obvious that I increased or initiated exposure to these stocks because of their relatively attractive dividend yields. I am still an income investor at heart.

I wouldn't say that all the stocks are of the "good to hold forever" variety but it should be obvious to regular readers that I am not averse to selling a stock if I am no longer impressed by its prospects. 

There are many examples which I have blogged about in the past and examples from this year are Perennial China Retail Trust and K-Green Trust in the list shared earlier.

Anyway, the total amount of dividends from non-REITs in 2014 is beefed up mostly by my rather big investment in Croesus Retail Trust which happened when its unit price took a severe beating shortly after its IPO. 

The relatively large increases to my investments in SPH and NeraTel also helped.

Income from non-REITs in 2014:
S$ 61,752.66

This figure could increase in 2015 despite losing the contributions from Perennial China Retail Trust, CapitaMalls Asia and K-Green Trust. This is because Ascendas Hospitality Trust will make a full year income contribution in 2015.

Of course, it is hard to say at this point in time if I could divest partially or fully some of the investments mentioned here in 2015. 

Indeed, I could also put more money to work in the stock market. So, nothing is set in stone. However, I do know that if valuations should go closer to crisis levels, I will be buying more.

I understand that the stock market could get a bit bumpy but my investments for income should provide me with much comfort and also help to fill my war chest in the meantime.

Related posts:
1. 2014 full year income from S-REITs.
2. AK went shopping in the (stock) market.
3. Be comfortable with being invested.
4. Mystical art of wealth accumulation.
5. Portfolio review: Unexpectedly eventful.
"... my decision to increase my level of investment in SPH and NeraTel last year so that my overall portfolio is less reliant on S-REITs for passive income was pre-emptive. Enlarging investments in Hock Lian Seng and Croesus Retail Trust earlier this year has also helped to reduce reliance on S-REITs for passive income."

Croesus Retail Trust: Acquisition of ONE'S MALL.

I had expected some form of equity fund raising and although I was hoping that it would be a rights issue, I was not surprised that a private placement has been chosen instead. It is more expeditious, after all.

However, it does not mean that I am happy about it since, in all likelihood, I won't be one of those "other investors" who would be offered new units in the Trust to be priced between 89c and 92c per unit. What? Unit price was about $1.00 when you last looked? Wow! 89c would be a steal, wouldn't it? Bummer.

Anyway, the acquisition of the new (freehold) mall, ONE'S MALL, in Greater Tokyo will cost about S$132.5 million.

The private placement is expected to raise S$70.2 million to S$72.6 million. The Trust will also be drawing upon a Japanese local bank loan for most of the shortfall (equivalent to S$74.1 million) at an interest rate of 1.29% per annum. I like the natural hedge that comes with this and also the very low interest rate.

A much smaller amount of S$6 million will be drawn from the Fixed Rate Notes issued in January this year. To utilise funds from the Fixed Rate Notes minimally is a good move as it attracts a higher interest rate of 4.6% and it is also denominated in S$. So, there will be some FOREX risk but it will be miniscule here with only S$6 million drawn.

Overall, income distribution per unit (DPU) is not expected to receive much of a boost with this acquisition because it is half funded by the private placement. Expect an increase of only 0.2% in DPU. Expect NAV/unit to increase by only 0.1%.

What about gearing level? As the purchase is about half funded by the private placement, gearing level stays more or less unchanged, reducing from 51.7% to 50.5%.

Nothing to be too excited about.

See announcement: here and here.

Related post:
Croesus Retail Trust: 4Q FY2014 DPU improved.

Croesus Retail Trust: 4Q FY2014 DPU improved as expected.

In May this year, I made an estimate on Croesus Retail Trust's possible forward yield. That was when DPU seemingly took a dip after the purchase of 2 malls.

At the time, I said that:

In the quarter April to June 2014, the 2 newly acquired malls will contribute a full quarter of income. This will bump up quarterly DPU. Annualising that DPU will more accurately reflect the annual DPU and hence the distribution yield of the Trust.

Of course, I was really staring hard into my schizophrenic bowling ball and hoping that it would cooperate when I also said:

With distribution income for January to March 2014 at JPY 619.78 million which gives us a DPU of 1.76c, an additional NPI of JPY 144.4 million (JPY 72.2 million x 2) will have some positive impact on DPU for the quarter April to June 2014. Even assuming that costs go up by some JPY 50 million (additional management fees and financial costs), we would still be looking at some additional JPY 94 million which can be distributed to unit holders. This is an increase of about 15%. So, we are looking at a DPU of possibly 2.024c.

Well, 4Q FY2014 DPU came in at 2.00c. My bowling ball was a bit off by about 1.2%. OK, no spa treatment (i.e. polishing) for it for the next two months!

To be fair, the two newly acquired properties began contributing their first full quarter of income when higher consumption taxes were introduced in Japan on 1 April 2014. Overall, consumers in Japan cut back on spending somewhat country wide. So, a DPU of 2.00c is, I believe, commendable.

So, what is the distribution yield now?

Of course, since my blog post in May, Croesus Retail Trust's unit price has gone up a fair bit, from 93c a unit to $1.02. This is an appreciation of 9.68% in 3 months.

So, yield has compressed. Annualising a quarterly DPU of 2.00c gives us 8c or a forward yield of 7.84% at a unit price of $1.02. For those who got in at 87c, yield on cost is almost 9.2%.

Would yield improve in future?

Distributable income looks set to improve in the next 12 months as tenants accounting for 20% of Croesus Retail Trust's total revenue will see their leases coming up for renewal. Positive rental reversions could also surprise on the high side as some leases have not seen any increase in rents for many years. This will result in a higher distribution yield for unit holders, all else remaining equal.

What to look out for?

The management of Croesus Retail Trust are still on the prowl for quality properties to acquire. However, with gearing rather high, some form of equity fund raising is probably required to either fully or partially fund future purchases. Whether they are able to do this in a way that would add value for existing unit holders would tell us something about the management.

See: Media Release.

Related posts:
1. Croesus Retail Trust: What is the forward yield?
2. Croesus Retail Trust: Motivations and risks.

Accordia Golf Trust: At what price is it a BUY?

Some readers asked me at what price would I be interested in Accordia Golf Trust since I have said that I was not willing to pay the IPO price of 97c a unit, believing that it did not represent good value for money although it promised a 7% distribution yield.

Some asked me if they should start buying once the unit price goes under the NAV per unit of 92c because with its IPO in Singapore just 0.7x subscribed, it could see unit price sinking quite rapidly on the first day of trading.

Of course, I almost never give a clear answer to questions like this.




However, I will say that although it could be nice to buy something below its NAV, when we are investing for income, we really want to see whether the level of income that is being generated is attractive enough and how much of that promised income to be distributed is sustainable.

To do this, I looked into the Trust's gearing. The first observation is the very high gearing level of about 53%. That is similar to Croesus Retail Trust's current gearing level and yet Accordia Golf Trust could only promise a distribution yield of 7%.

Next, I looked at the way its debt has been structured. Long term debt really consists of three term loans of JPY 15 billion each.

The first term loan is for 3 years and the cost? 1.25% +
The second term loan is for 4 years. 1.5% +
The third term loan is for 5 years. 1.75% +

What is that "+" for? Cost of debt is actually a base percentage + the 6 months JPY TIBOR. If you don't know what TIBOR is, it stands for Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate which is forecast to be about 0.3%.

I feel that the TIBOR is likely to stay low for some time as Prime Minister Abe keeps borrowing costs low to encourage economic growth and works towards a targeted sustainable inflation rate of 2% per annum for the country. So, there could be some comfort there despite the high gearing level.

Just like Saizen REIT's loans, the term loans here are amortising in nature. Per term loan, the Trust has to pay JPY 75 million half yearly starting 31 March 2015. This means JPY 75 million x 6 in a year starting 31 March 2015. Per year: JPY 450 million.

On top of this, interest payment if estimated on the high side using 2% is about JPY 0.9 billion or 900 million

With total annual comprehensive income at almost JPY 6 billion, yearly debt repayment will be about 22% of annual comprehensive income from March 2015 to July 2017. In August 2017, the 3 year term loan will have to be fully paid.

Of course, by then, let us hope that the Trust would have found some way of refinancing since it would probably be impossible for them to pay off the remaining JPY 13.6 billion or so in the first term loan using internal resources.

Accordia Golf Trust's guidance is to pay out 90% of its income to unit holders from the 2nd year onwards but what is the distributable income available then? Ah! That is a question people might not have asked as they simply assumed that it would be 90% of the first year's DPU.

At the exchange rate of S$12.20 to JPY 1,000, assuming an annual comprehensive income of S$73.2 million and almost 1.1 billion units in issue, we would get a DPU of 6.65c if 100% of income is distributed to unit holders. If we should expect that only 78% of comprehensive income would be available for distribution from March 2015, then, DPU falls to 5.2c. If we still want that 7% yield, then, unit price has to fall to 74c which is a 24% decline from the IPO price.

Now, if only 90% is to be distributed, DPU could be as low as 5.2c x .9 or 4.68c.

So, at what price would I be interested in initiating a long position in Accordia Golf Trust? Let me talk to my bowling ball and I hope it is in a talkative mood.

Related post:
Accordia Golf Trust: 7% distribution yield.

Accordia Golf Trust: 6.8% to 7% distribution yield.

A new business trust is set to list in Singapore and it owns golf courses in Japan. The IPO is expected to price the units between 97c to $1.00 each and distribution yield is going to be between 6.8% to 7%.

I have not looked at the prospectus but I tried to understand how the manager is compensated. It is frankly quite complicated to me. It isn't as straightforward as a trust involving real estate. See if you understand it: Golf Course Management Agreement (page 3).

I also looked at some published figures and I am not sure that the assets are doing very well:



Click to enlarge.

I would draw attention to "net income per share" and "dividend per share". Interesting, isn't it?

See: financial highlights.

Could Accordia Golf Trust see a meteoric rise in unit price like Croesus Retail Trust did during its IPO? Your guess is as good as mine. However, I know that I will be giving the IPO a miss.

Read article:
Accordia Golf Trust to list on SGX.

Related post:
High yielding business trusts: A discussion.

Croesus Retail Trust: What is the forward yield?

Not feeling 100% tonight. So, I am just going to zoom in on what bothers people most and skip the rest of the stuff which look OK anyway.

So, what bothers people most? The latest quarterly DPU of 1.76c.

If we were to simply annualise 1.76c, we would get 7.04c and based on a unit price of 93c, that is a distribution yield of only 7.57%. This definitely falls short of the IPO forecast of an 8% distribution yield.

An 8% distribution yield based on 93c would mean a DPU of some 7.44c per annum or 1.86c per quarter. Yikes! With only 1.76c, we have a shortfall of some 0.1c and this is after purchasing 2 more properties in the last quarter too!

There is a simple explanation. There are costs involved in the purchase of those 2 malls and they only contributed to income in the month of March. Of course, we can say something about the Japanese Yen being weak but currency hedge has already been put in place by the management.

In the quarter April to June 2014, the 2 newly acquired malls will contribute a full quarter of income. This will bump up quarterly DPU. Annualising that DPU will more accurately reflect the annual DPU and hence the distribution yield of the Trust.

The monthly NPI for the 2 newly acquired malls is estimated to be JPY 72.2 million. Refer to page 14 of the slides presentation.

With distribution income for January to March 2014 at JPY 619.78 million which gives us a DPU of 1.76c, an additional NPI of JPY 144.4 million (JPY 72.2 million x 2) will have some positive impact on DPU for the quarter April to June 2014. Even assuming that costs go up by some JPY 50 million (additional management fees and financial costs), we would still be looking at some additional JPY 94 million which can be distributed to unit holders. This is an increase of about 15%. So, we are looking at a DPU of possibly 2.024c.

Annualising 2.024c gives us 8.096c or a yield of 8.7% based on a unit price of 93c.  This is some 8.75% higher than the 8% distribution yield dangled during the Trust's IPO.

Having said this, I won't buy more at 93c a unit. It could be that I have anchored myself at 87c and 87.5c, my entry prices, but I feel that 93c is not all that compelling.

Wait a minute, wasn't the distribution yield estimated at 8.5% when I initiated my first long position at 87c last November? Why do I now say that an 8.7% yield is not compelling? Well, back in November, the gearing level was about 42%. Now, at 53.5%, to a simple minded person like me, getting another 0.2% in yield just doesn't cut it.

For a Trust that has a gearing level of 53.5%, I need a much higher distribution yield to be able to sleep better at night. Everything else remaining equal, a 9.5% distribution yield could, perhaps, entice me to add to my long position.

See presentation slides: here.

Related posts:
1. Croesus Retail Trust: 87c.
2. Luz Omori and Niz Wave I.

Portfolio review: Unexpectedly eventful.

At the end of last year, I shared the results of my efforts in the stock market and also my strategy to grow wealth and augment income in the new year. Quite a few things have happened since then. So, I decided to do a review of how things have moved.

In the S-REITs department, the biggest change this year to my portfolio has to be the major divestment in Sabana REIT. My current long position in the REIT is just a bit more than 10% of my investment at its largest. Whatever I have left is free of cost and will continue to generate passive income although on a much smaller scale.

Also in the S-REITs department, I took part in AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT's rights issue and tried to get more excess rights but without much success. Recently, I sold a small percentage of my investment, believing that it was the right thing to do as its unit price ran up, post rights. This REIT is still my largest investment in S-REITs. Having said this, passive income received from this REIT will shrink some 15% this year, given the dilution from the recent rights issue.

In the Business Trusts department, I decided to divest completely my investment in Perennial China Retail Trust after receiving another round of income distribution which I concluded was unsustainable. This was before the takeover offer by St. James.

Also in the Business Trusts department, in late January, I more than doubled my investment in Croesus Retail Trust, believing that, trading at a discount to valuation and offering an attractive income distribution, it is a more dependable passive income generator than Perennial China Retail Trust. Although its relatively high level of gearing is a concern for some, there is unlikely to be any nasty surprises in the area of financing over the next few years.

In other stocks, I added to my long positions in Yongnam and Hock Lian Seng. Yongnam hit a rough patch, as expected. However, things are likely to improve later this year and probably the next. It is a leader in what it does and it has a very good track record. Last year's performance was exceptionally bad and probably would not be repeated. I like how Yongnam started to pay meaningful dividends in recent years and this is likely to continue, conditions permitting.

Hock Lian Seng, like Yongnam, is in the construction sector and also like Yongnam, I expect it to be a beneficiary of increased spending on infrastructure projects in the country. Already, Hock Lian Seng won two major projects which have bumped up its order book and will provide earnings visibility for some time to come. There will probably be more order wins in future. Of course, Hock Lian Seng also pays meaningful dividends which I like.

One stock which I have been waiting for an opportunity to accumulate was CapitaMalls Asia. Well, it is a pity that it will be taken private by its parent, CapitaLand, which offered $2.22 a share. I feel that it is a fair enough price which, perhaps, suggests that the price at IPO was unfair but I will let readers draw their own conclusions in this contentious issue. My acceptance form has been sent out.

A stock which I have turned more cautious on is Marco Polo Marine. Recent developments mean that the business is now somewhat different from what I envisioned it to be in my initial investment thesis. Not giving enough consideration to how the tugs and barges could be a drag on overall performance before, I decided to trim my exposure to the stock. Things could improve in future but, for now, the level of clarity has lowered.

The first few months of the year have turned out to be a bit more eventful than expected on the investment front. My war chest is now fuller through some divestments as well as dividends received. I do not have any immediate plans for the funds and I will probably just hold on to them for now. After all, I had felt that I was too much invested in the stock market and had desired a bigger cash position.

Of course, if I were to keep the status quo, I will, for sure, receive a much lower level of income from my investments in S-REITs this year. How much lower? I guess we will know by end of the year.

Having said this, my decision to increase my level of investment in SPH and NeraTel last year so that my overall portfolio is less reliant on S-REITs for passive income was pre-emptive. Enlarging investments in Hock Lian Seng and Croesus Retail Trust earlier this year has also helped to reduce reliance on S-REITs for passive income.

What next? I certainly do not know if the economy will do well or if it would suffer a decline in the next few years. However, I do know that I am staying invested as long as my investments have reasonably sturdy fundamentals and, preferably, are able to generate reasonably good income for me. They don't have to be stellar performers and I don't have a problem with getting rich slowly.

I will simply wait for Mr. Market to feel depressed enough to sell more to me at prices I cannot refuse while I collect regular dividends in the meantime.

Related posts:
1. A strategy to grow wealth and augment income.
2. Sabana REIT: 1Q 2014 DPU 1.88c.
3. AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT: $1.425.
4. Perennial China Retail Trust: Fully divested.
5. Croesus Retail Trust: DPU above forecast.
6. Yongnam: DPS of 0.6c.
7. Hock Lian Seng: $221.8 million contract.
8. CapitaMalls Asia: Farewell.
9. Marco Polo Marine: Price weakness.
10. SPH: Within expectations.
11. NeraTel: A very good investment.