Tea with Solace: Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust.

This is a guest blog from a regular guest blogger, Solace, on a REIT in his portfolio. I always appreciate Solace's guest blogs which show how much thought he puts into every single one of his investments in the stock market. I hope you find Solace's guest blogs beneficial like I have.

So, here is Solace's Review of 
Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust (MGCCT):

MGCCT got listed on March 2013. It was oversubscribed and the general feeling of the stock market at the time was bullish. I subscribed to this IPO and was one of the lucky people who received allocation of shares. I did a quick flip on the first day of IPO and realized a gain of about 11%.

The reason for selling during the first day of trading and my subsequent relook at the stock more than a year later will be discussed further.

Asset Portfolio

MGCCT consists of just two mixed use assets - Festival Walk and Gateway Plaza.

Festival Walk

A landmark territorial retail mall and lifestyle destination with an office component, comprising a seven-storey retail mall with a four-storey office tower and three underground car park levels, located in the upscale residential area of Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.

Gateway Plaza

A premier Grade A office building with a retail atrium, consisting of two 25-storey towers connected by a three-storey retail atrium and three underground floors, located in the established and mature prime Lufthansa Area in Beijing, China.

The two properties cover a gross floor area of approximately 2.4 million square feet and the total net lettable area is about 1.9 Mil square feet.

With only 2 properties, it is easier to do an analysis but it also presented a problem of its own, Concentration Risk.

One has to take note that Festival Walk alone contributes to 75 per cent of the asset value and gross revenue of the Reit. The performance of the REIT is tied to the fortunes of the Festival Walk. As an investor we should do our homework to ensure that we can predict the earning power of the mall or we might be in for a big surprise if the earnings tumble down the road along and, with it, the share price.

Portfolio Performance thus far

Gross revenue and Net Property income has shown to be beat initial forecasts in prospectus and reported to outperform Y-O-Y comparing FY Quarters to Quarters.

Festival Walk remained fully occupied at 100% for both retail and office sectors. Shopper traffic and tenant sales in 1Q FY14/15 increased slightly at 0.5% and 0.1% respectively year on year. Of the retail leases expiring in FY14/15 at Festival Walk, 90% have been renewed or re-let with rental uplift of 21%. Weighted Average Lease Expiry (WALE) by Gross Rental Income of Festival Walk is 2.9 years. Do take note that for FY16/17, 22% of Gross rental income is due to be renew.

The committed occupancy at Gateway Plaza was 98.6% as of 30 June 2014. These committed leases represented tenants from the automobile and machinery sectors. As of 30 June 2014, 80% of the leases expiring in FY14/15 have been committed, with a significant rental uplift of 33% against preceding rental rates. WALE for Gateway Plaza it is 2.5 years.

Key Financial Indicators and Capital Management.

Gearing Ratios: 38.6%

Interest Coverage Ratio: 4.8 x

Total Debt Outstanding: HK$11,455 m

Weighted Debt Maturity: 2.7 years

Annualised DPU (cents): 6.257 cents

Distribution Policy: Semi- Annual Basis

Gearing Ratio is definitely on the high side. A silver lining would be in order to mitigate the risk of rising interest rates; more than 70% of MGCCT’s debt has been fixed for FY14/15 and FY15/16.

To ensure stability of distributions, MGCCT has hedged 90% of HK$ Distributable Income forecasted for FY14/15 and is actively monitoring the market to progressively convert RMB Distributable Income to SGD when the rates are favourable.

Management Fees Structure.

How Reits pay their manager through fees has been questioned from time to time. MGCCT is one of the first Reits to adopt DPU-based fee model rather than the traditional asset based fee structure that most S-Reits use. This is touted to be superior as most of the return from a Reits is delivered via DPU yield.

However, some would argue tying fees based on DPU may or may not necessarily better align the interests of the management and unit holders. A group will believe that fees tied to assets are more stable and makes it easier to pursue asset enhancement activities. There is also a possibility of managers using the DPU based model to focus on short term gain through increase use of gearing to boost DPU, but set itself up for disaster over the long term.

There is no evident of MGCCT behaving this way currently. I do not have opinion on this matter as I believe no fee structure is fool proof. Concentrating on the track records of the manager seems to be a wiser choice.

Solace's Recent Actions.

At Listing Date of 7 March 2013, issue price was $0.93 (NAV/unit $0.91). It had a projected dividend yield of 5.6% for FY 13/14 and 6.1% for FY 14/15. I sold the shares when the price reached $1.04. Translates to about 11.8% gain.

At the price, I felt that it makes sense to cash in. It was above NAV, the projected yield of 5.6% didn’t justify the concentration risk and high gearing in my opinion. I needed to have bigger safety margins and want to see that the management can achieve its DPU while paying close attention to the performance of Festival Walk.

When prices break below 90 cents towards the end of last year, I decide to the put the Reits back in my watch list. Also during the waiting period, it has shown that the Mapletree pedigree had delivered again with reports of DPU and NPI beating forecasts in prospectus.

It was a game of waiting patiently to see if the price would drop to a level where the dividend yield was more acceptable to me with the concentration risk in mind.

I pick up some shares in at prices from 83 cents to 85 cents a unit. Average entry is about 84 cents. This gives me a dividend yield of about 7.5% which is more acceptable to me. It was revealed that some of the senior managements also bought shares in recent months at $0.805 and $0.80. It is always a plus point if one can load up at about the same price as the board of directors.

If the share price declines to a level close to dividend yield 8% again, I might be interested to increase exposure again.

Read some of Solace's other guest blogs:
1. Frasers Centrepoint Limited (FCL).
2. King Wan Corp. Ltd.
3. Common Sense Investing.

Managing exposure in AK's investment portfolio: Examples.

I received a few emails and comments both in my blog and on my FB wall regarding Yongnam and Marco Polo Marine. In the wake of their dismal results, some are wondering if they should stay invested. Of course, I won't tell people what they should do but I can share with them how I manage my portfolio so that I do not lose sleep over it.

 

Regular readers and attendees of InvestX Congress a couple of months ago might remember the graphic of a pyramid which I shared. In case you do not remember, it is found in this blog post: Motivations and methods in investing.

Many know that I invest primarily for income and these investments form part of the wider base of the pyramid. It is about investing for a predictable and, ideally, sustainable flow of income. Such investments provide my portfolio with a measure of stability that I desire.

I also invest for income and growth. This is about investing in companies which have the potential to grow and have shown some promise through their track records. On top of this, I like for them to show a commitment to pay dividends. Of course, I said before that both Yongnam and Marco Polo Marine were in this category.

I also invest purely for growth but this is higher up in the pyramid and such investments, without any dividends, should form a smaller portion of my portfolio.

So, for example, I reduced my exposure to Marco Polo Marine as it would probably struggle to pay a dividend now because not all its businesses are doing well but I am still optimistic that the company would see impressive growth if the purchase of the oil rig should work out the way the CEO thinks it should.

Now, what about Yongnam? They announced a bigger loss than expected in its latest results. A question to ask is whether this weakness is enduring or is it temporary? I am inclined to believe that it is temporary. So, I am staying invested.

With Yongnam, it is about securing more projects and, hopefully, those with higher margins. Although I am optimistic that Yongnam will do better in future, in the near term, the thesis for investing in Yongnam for both income and growth has been shaken. So, I might reduce exposure, similar to what I did with my investment in Marco Polo Marine.

Now, some might ask if I would lose money by reducing exposure. I might.

Might? Yes, might, not would.

It is good to remember that in all my investment decisions, it is partly about getting in with a margin of safety. Of course, with trading decisions, it could be quite different.

Also, because I usually invest with an income angle in mind, losses, if any, are less daunting, taking past dividends into consideration.

If I had divested some of my investments when stock prices ran up, then, I could actually end up with a gain even if I were to reduce my remaining long positions at a loss later on. I did this for Yongnam before but, unfortunately, I did not do so for Marco Polo Marine. Why?

Yongnam's share price ran up because of speculation regarding its chances of getting that big job in Myanmar. Marco Polo Marine's share price ran up, I believe, because it was undervalued compared to its peers. So, a partial divestment in Yongnam's case when prices ran up was only reasonable to me but not in Marco Polo Marine's case.

We don't always do well in our investments as conditions change and these changes might throw a spanner or a few in our analyses. However, if we

1. Invest cautiously, always demanding a margin of safety,

2. Take some gains off the table when given the opportunity,

3. Stay invested if the investment still holds promise,

Over time, we won't do too badly.

Finally, it probably pays for some to remember that my investments in Marco Polo Marine and Yongnam are bits of a bigger investment portfolio. They are not my only investments. Remember the pyramid. Know what we are after and our methods should reflect our motivations.

Related posts:
1. Yongnam: DPS of 0.6c.
2. Marco Polo Marine: Reason for weakness.
3. Portfolio review: Unexpectedly eventful.

Accordia Golf Trust: At what price is it a BUY?

Some readers asked me at what price would I be interested in Accordia Golf Trust since I have said that I was not willing to pay the IPO price of 97c a unit, believing that it did not represent good value for money although it promised a 7% distribution yield.

Some asked me if they should start buying once the unit price goes under the NAV per unit of 92c because with its IPO in Singapore just 0.7x subscribed, it could see unit price sinking quite rapidly on the first day of trading.

Of course, I almost never give a clear answer to questions like this.




However, I will say that although it could be nice to buy something below its NAV, when we are investing for income, we really want to see whether the level of income that is being generated is attractive enough and how much of that promised income to be distributed is sustainable.

To do this, I looked into the Trust's gearing. The first observation is the very high gearing level of about 53%. That is similar to Croesus Retail Trust's current gearing level and yet Accordia Golf Trust could only promise a distribution yield of 7%.

Next, I looked at the way its debt has been structured. Long term debt really consists of three term loans of JPY 15 billion each.

The first term loan is for 3 years and the cost? 1.25% +
The second term loan is for 4 years. 1.5% +
The third term loan is for 5 years. 1.75% +

What is that "+" for? Cost of debt is actually a base percentage + the 6 months JPY TIBOR. If you don't know what TIBOR is, it stands for Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate which is forecast to be about 0.3%.

I feel that the TIBOR is likely to stay low for some time as Prime Minister Abe keeps borrowing costs low to encourage economic growth and works towards a targeted sustainable inflation rate of 2% per annum for the country. So, there could be some comfort there despite the high gearing level.

Just like Saizen REIT's loans, the term loans here are amortising in nature. Per term loan, the Trust has to pay JPY 75 million half yearly starting 31 March 2015. This means JPY 75 million x 6 in a year starting 31 March 2015. Per year: JPY 450 million.

On top of this, interest payment if estimated on the high side using 2% is about JPY 0.9 billion or 900 million

With total annual comprehensive income at almost JPY 6 billion, yearly debt repayment will be about 22% of annual comprehensive income from March 2015 to July 2017. In August 2017, the 3 year term loan will have to be fully paid.

Of course, by then, let us hope that the Trust would have found some way of refinancing since it would probably be impossible for them to pay off the remaining JPY 13.6 billion or so in the first term loan using internal resources.

Accordia Golf Trust's guidance is to pay out 90% of its income to unit holders from the 2nd year onwards but what is the distributable income available then? Ah! That is a question people might not have asked as they simply assumed that it would be 90% of the first year's DPU.

At the exchange rate of S$12.20 to JPY 1,000, assuming an annual comprehensive income of S$73.2 million and almost 1.1 billion units in issue, we would get a DPU of 6.65c if 100% of income is distributed to unit holders. If we should expect that only 78% of comprehensive income would be available for distribution from March 2015, then, DPU falls to 5.2c. If we still want that 7% yield, then, unit price has to fall to 74c which is a 24% decline from the IPO price.

Now, if only 90% is to be distributed, DPU could be as low as 5.2c x .9 or 4.68c.

So, at what price would I be interested in initiating a long position in Accordia Golf Trust? Let me talk to my bowling ball and I hope it is in a talkative mood.

Related post:
Accordia Golf Trust: 7% distribution yield.

Sabana REIT: Weaknesses & uncertainties.

Sabana REIT has not shown much improvement in its quarterly results which probably shows that the leasing environment for industrial properties remains challenging and that the management made a bad decision in purchasing a half vacant high tech industrial building from AMD in Chai Chee late last year. Overall occupancy for the REIT's property portfolio inched up from 90.6% to 90.8%.

Things could get worse because 3 more master leases are expiring by end of this year while 11 master leases are expiring by end of next year. If what we saw late last year when 4 out of 5 master leases were not renewed should become the norm, Sabana REIT could see overall occupancy level declining much more and, consequently, we could see its distributable income lowering further.

Already, we know that 1 out of 3 master leases expiring this year will not be renewed.

Considering the fact that interest rates would probably be higher in future than not, when we look at REITs, we must always look at their debt level. A big chunk of debt, all $177.6 million of it, will be maturing in August 2015. That is barely a year away. We can only hope that they refinance it soon and at an interest rate that is either lower or unchanged from current level. Of course, a longer loan period would be preferred.

Gearing level is also much higher now at 37% compared to its IPO days when it was 26.5% while quarterly DPU has declined from an estimated 2.16c then to just 1.86c now. From these numbers alone, we can say that the management has not managed to grow the value of the REIT for retail investors. It is also worth noting that its interest cover ratio has been in steady decline from a very robust 7.9x to just 4.3x today.

Sabana REIT to me, now, is a picture of weaknesses and uncertainties.

1. Weakness in occupancy.

2. Weakness in making progress to fill up vacant space.

3. Weakness in DPU growth.

4. Weakness in its balance sheet.

5. Uncertainty regarding the renewal of expiring master leases.

6. Uncertainty as to whether vacant spaces will be reasonably filled soon.

7. Uncertainty as to whether higher cost of debt could be avoided.

Can the REIT overcome all its weaknesses? Well, I am hopeful that we could see some progress in filling up vacant spaces which could lead to higher income and a higher DPU. How long will it take? Well, this is one of those uncertainties I listed. It could take quite a while judging from the almost lack of progress in the last three months.

So, should it come as a surprise that Innotek Limited decided to sell their investment, amounting to 15,000,000 units in the REIT?

Of course, readers who have been following my coverage of Sabana REIT would know that I have divested some 90% of my original investment in Sabana REIT. Would I consider increasing my exposure to the REIT again?

All investments are good at the right price and for me to want to buy into Sabana REIT now, I would need a much higher distribution yield considering all the weaknesses and the uncertainties which I have listed.

This could either come about through a meaningful increase in DPU or a decrease in unit price, all else remaining equal.

Which would be more likely to happen in the next 12 to 18 months, I wonder?

See presentation slides:
Sabana REIT presentation 16 July 2014.

Related posts:
1. Innotek Limited to divest 15 million units.
2. Added more Croesus and reduced Sabana.
3. Portfolio review: Unexpectedly eventful.
4. Sabana REIT: 1Q 2014 DPU 1.88c.
"From what I can see, all four expense items are here to stay. So, even if the REIT should achieve 100% occupancy once again, it will be difficult for it to achieve a DPU that is even close to that of last quarter's."
AK, 17 April 2014.

First REIT: Higher quarterly DPU of 2.00c.

First REIT is one of my longest holding investments and currently my second largest investment in an S-REIT.

So, a higher quarterly DPU is going to have a more significant positive impact on passive income received from investments for the full year. The details?

A DPU of 2.00c will be paid on 29 August 2014. XD date is 21 July 2014.

With full income contribution yet to be realised for the recently acquired Siloam Hospital Purwakarta, DPU in the next quarter could see a slight increase, everything else remaining equal.

Gearing is comfortable at 32.9%. Once refinancing of a short term loan facility is completed, First REIT will not have any debt due until 2017. This gives me a peace of mind.



Click to enlarge.

First REIT is still an investment for keeps.

See slides presentation:
First REIT presentation 15 July 2014.

Related post:
A way to a double digit yielding portfolio.

Marco Polo Marine: Reason for price weakness.

Yesterday, a couple of readers asked me what could be wrong with Marco Polo Marine since the share price declined. A reader also asked me where the next support could be, using technical analysis. Last night, I checked if there were any announcements from the company and found a plausible reason for the recent weakness in share price.

We know that Marco Polo Marine has an Indonesian subsidiary, PT Pelayaran National Bina Buana Raya (BBR). Well, the subsidiary has released 1Q 2014 results and the numbers are very bad. Of course, BBR is not all of Marco Polo Marine's business but it is a significant part. So, I would expect Marco Polo Marine's own quarterly results to be affected. How badly affected would depend on how other business segments perform, of course.

Now, the BBR story:

Over at BBR, revenue reduced by 11% while direct expenses increased almost 20%.

The OSV segment of the business did well as revenue improved some 57.3%. However, Tug and Barge vessels segment of the business saw a reduction in revenue by some 47.5%. (The two segments put together, OSV segment now has a 61.5% share of total revenue.)

OSVs are clearly profitable while Tug and Barge vessels are not. Why? OSVs recorded $4.8 million in revenue and incurred expenses of $2.1 million. However, Tug and Barge vessels recorded $3.18 million in revenue but incurred expenses of $4.37 million! This segment bled massively!

In the same quarter in the preceding year, the Tug and Barge vessels segment of the business turned in a revenue of $5.84 million and incurred expenses of $3.95 million. This suggests to me that the expenses incurred by this segment has been quite consistent but the revenue drop, year on year, is astounding!

If this were to continue, BBR would be better off without the Tug and Barge vessels segment of the business. Gross profit declined a massive 62.5%. Operating income declined by 73.5%. After financial charges and income tax, total comprehensive income reduced by 92.1% for the quarter, year on year!

How does this affect my investment thesis?

With the decision to gear up significantly to purchase a jack up rig which could potentially double earnings in FY2016, I was prepared to accept lower earnings in the next two years because of the much higher finance costs resulting from the MTNs although I have to admit that the jack up rig was never a part of my initial investment thesis for Marco Polo Marine.

With the jack up rig and higher finance cost thrown in for the next couple of years, I rationalised that as long as operating income improves steadily over time with more OSVs being added in the same period of time, logically, any decline in earnings due to the higher finance costs could be cushioned. This was an important assumption.

I said that to stay invested in Marco Polo Marine is to believe that:

1. Earnings will improve as more OSVs join the fleet in the next 2 years.

2. The rig delivery by end of 2015 will improve earnings massively.

If well executed, the strategy will catapult earnings upwards, possibly doubling EPS by 2016.

Now, for earnings to improve gradually over time until the jack up rig is delivered by end of 2015, I had focused on the OSV segment of the business as the growth driver. I had simply assumed that the Tug and Barge vessels segment of the business would continue plodding on and that the segment's revenue and expenses would more or less stay constant.

So, for BBR's Tug and Barge vessels segment to turn in a massive loss is a shocker and this has thrown a spanner into my thesis for having a significant investment in Marco Polo Marine.

Does it mean I no longer believe that Marco Polo Marine is on the right track? No. In fact, if not for the decision to focus on growing its fleet of OSVs, BBR would have turned in a loss making quarter instead of one with much lower earnings.
 
Unfortunately, to be realistic, FY 2014's numbers could turn out to be disappointing, everything else remaining equal. This is even if the Tug and Barge vessels segment of BBR's business should see revenue improving and expenses reducing in the next two quarters to what should be the mean.

Lower utilisation of the Tug and Barge vessels in the preceding quarter was put down to seasonal factors (i.e. monsoon period). Expectations of a reversion to the mean did not happen. Is this weakness in the segment temporary or is it going to be more enduring? I am inclined to believe that it is temporary but if a reversion to the mean does not happen in the following quarter, then, the risk of being invested in Marco Polo Marine could be much higher than initially thought.

I am staying invested as I still believe in the growth story but I should move Marco Polo Marine higher up in the pyramid (see related post no. 1 below) from an investment that is for growth and some income to just being an investment for growth. Without the income component, my approach will demand that I trim the size of my investment in the business.

See BBR's 1Q 2014 results: here.

Related posts:
1. Motivations and methods in investing.
2. Marco Polo Marine: Drilling for higher income.

PCRT: Full divestment.

In a recent blog post, I compared Croesus Retail Trust and Perennial China Retail Trust, explaining why although both are business trusts, the former is a better investment for income.

I avoided Perennial China Retail Trust at its IPO in 2011 believing that the distribution yield did not compensate investors sufficiently for the level of risk which they were being asked to take on. I only initiated a long position at a much lower price of 47.5c a unit much later in the middle of 2012.





I did that because I believed that the level of risk had reduced significantly and that the distribution yield of more than 8% or so was sufficient compensation while I waited for the Trust to deliver better results.

About a year ago, I mentioned that the earn out deeds which the Trust was distributing income from will be exhausted by end of the year 2014 and that the management must work harder to ensure its portfolio of assets pick up the slack. When I blogged about the Trust again in November last year, some encouraging progress was made.

In the latest announcements by the Trust, although I am pleased to see that progress continues to be made, I am very concerned that, by the management's own admission, the situation in Shenyang is still challenging. I recently shared this concern with some friends over a lunch gathering too. Shenyang Longemont offices, completed in 2012, is still less than half occupied by the end of December 2013.





So, where is the Trust's income coming from? Its 50% share of the properties in Shenyang contributed $2.25 million in Q4. Perennial Jihua Mall in Foshan contributed $1.28 million in Q4. Assuming that the Trust makes no progress and keeps the status quo, these properties should generate a gross revenue of some $21.56 million this year.

The 5th and last property in the Trust's IPO portfolio is Perennial Qingyang Mall in Chengdu. This is to begin operations in April 2014. This is a bigger mall than the one in Foshan and has secured 85% leasing commitment thus far. If we were to assume a similar level of revenue as what has been achieved by Perennial Jihua Mall in Foshan, this mall could contribute $5.12 million in yearly revenue or more.

So, realistically, the Trust's IPO portfolio of properties should be able to generate some $26.68 million in gross revenue on a full year basis. This is a conservative estimate, all else remaining equal. Not too shabby especially if we consider the fact that there is still quite a bit of vacant office and retail space to be filled.

However, there are costs to take into consideration. In the department of costs, there are recurring costs and one off costs. I will take in just the recurring costs in this analysis because they will impact results on a more enduring basis.





Trustee-Manager's fees, I estimate these at $6.8 million a year once Perennial Qingyang Mall in Chengdu is completed. Finance costs, I estimate these at $10.28 million a year. Assuming that there are no one-off costs in the full year which, of course, is most unlikely, these two major recurring costs would already amount to $17.08 million a year.

Remember that, in earlier blog posts, I mentioned that Perennial China Retail Trust could half income distributions to unit holders once the earned out deeds are exhausted by end of 2014? Now, using the numbers I just presented above, that statement could have been too optimistic.





In an unrealistically optimistic scenario, the Trust could be distributing $16.4 million of income to unit holders a year. Of course, this does not take into consideration possible further improvement in occupancy. However, it also does not consider costs apart from the Trustee-Manager's fees and finance costs. In such an instance, hypothetically, how much income is that going to translate to on a per unit basis?

Right now, the Trust has a DPU of about 3.8c a year. This translates to about $44 million a year for the Trust. So, proportionally, we could see DPU fall to 1.41c a year in 2015.

Now, when we are reminded of the fact that Perennial China Retail Trust said at its IPO that they would distribute at least 50% of distributable income to unit holders, DPU could then be as little as 0.71c in 2015.

Bear in mind that the Trust has two other malls under development, Perennial Dongzhan Shopping Mall in Chengdu (80% share) and an integrated development in Tongzhou (10% share). The former is to be completed in another year or so while the latter in another 2 or 3 years.

Progressive payments must be made and the Trust could either resort to more debt or tap the cashflow generated by its portfolio of completed assets. Which option would the Trust adopt? I don't know but I do know that DPU will take a big hit in 2015 no matter which option is adopted.

Now, what?





My assumption made last year that DPU, in the worst case scenario, will drop by half in 2015 and thereby delivering at least a 4% yield on my purchase price of 47.5c per unit has been very much undermined.

I do not know if the Trust will do better in the next couple of years but for me to stay invested would require a lot more than just faith in the management that they will deliver in future. I need to be adequately paid while I wait.

Last year, I partially divested my investment in the Trust at 61.5c a unit. Today, at XD, I divested my remaining investment at 50c a unit, booking a very small gain of 5.26% but I will receive the 1.9c per unit of income distribution as well.





This is probably a good time to remind myself of something Warren Buffett once said:

"Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results."

For anyone still vested in PCRT, I hope the Trust does deliver eventually and that its operating assets will do well enough to generate enough income for distributable income to be maintained. Otherwise, a big reduction in distributable income could also possibly lead to a big decline in stock price.

So, what do I think is a fair value for PCRT? I won't give a number but the day PCRT is able to offer me a reasonably attractive distribution yield using only 50% of its distributable income and at the same time maintain a relatively strong balance sheet, I could be interested again.

See: 4Q Financial Statements.
See: Presentation Slides.
See: Appendices.







After writing this blog post, I found that the latest issue of The EDGE has an article on Perennial China Retail Trust in which Pua Seck Guan revealed that he is looking into the possibility of liquidating some of the Trust's assets in order to continue funding payouts to investors to avoid disappointing them in 2015 and beyond. With this strategy, he hopes to continue giving a DPU of 3.86 cents per annum.

Although it is reassuring to a certain extent that there is a plan to maintain DPU, we have to remember that a plan like this, even if executed successfully, is essentially a return of capital. It seems to me like a desperate measure amidst very challenging conditions.

If we wish to invest in income generating properties and get a meaningful yield on our investment, I believe that there are better options available, options which would not have to resort to asset sale in order to fund future payouts.

Related posts:
1. Perennial China Retail Trust: 1H 2013 DPU 1.9c.
2. Perennial China Retail Trust: Progress in Q3.
3. Croesus Retail Trust and Perennial China Retail Trust.

Tea with Solace: Frasers Centrepoint Limited (FCL)

A Peek into Frasers Centrepoint Limited (FCL)

Frasers Cpt (FCL) has been spun off by F&N, the real estate division carved off from its operation business. It was listed on the SGX Mainboard on 9 Jan 14. The stock opened at $1.61, reaching a high of about $1.70 a couple of days later before retreating to the current price of $1.41 to $1.42.

FCL operates as an international real estate company. It owns many properties that we are very familiar with. It has major stakes in two REITs – FCT and FCOT.

Souce: FCL 1Q14 Results Presentation. Click to enlarge.

Financial Highlights

Revenue increased by about 87% and PBIT increased by about 63% Year on Year. The strong set of 1Q14 results showed year on year gains in all segments. Strong overseas development sales were the key driver.

Development PBIT rose by about 121% year on year. It was led by Australia with the completion of One Central Park (CP) and Park Lane Block 5A in Sydney. As for China, around 750 units were sold in 1Q14, but the overall residential market remains cautious in China. In Singapore, Overall prices declined 0.9% q-o-q in 4Q13. Around 15,000 new homes were sold in 2013, 32% lower compared than 2012

Given the increasingly cautious sentiment in the local property market which has been affected by cooling measures, Frasers Centrepoint’s strategy of venturing overseas can put it in a good position for further growth,

There was also an increase in commercial rents and room rates with higher contribution from One@Changi City . Construction of Waterway Point is progressing well, slated to be completed in 2015.

Currently the Net Asset Value per share is $2.15. At current price of about $1.41, it is about 35% discount to its NAV. I am vested at this price

I resisted entering when it was trading at $1.50 or $1.60. Recently, I make a comparison of similar real estate companies listed in Singapore. On average, they are trading at about 0.75x book value. At current price of $1.41, with about 35% discount to NAV, I feel comfortable vested in FCL properties. Valuation is attractive in my opinion.

FCL has a net debt to equity of about 50%, which I am uncomfortable with. Recent media reports suggest that FCL will launch a hospitality trust, which could raise S$600m. Once they spin out the hospitality REIT, they should be able to move some debt off their books. This asset recycling move is beneficial to FCL similar to what OUE and SPH have done in recent times.

This move can fund new acquisitions and allow them to be asset light. This strategy also allows them to earn more REIT management fees and improve its commercial portfolio.

Potential Risks

FCL has a small free float of only about 12%. This does not sit well with large investors. Hopefully, this will change over time. Increasing FCL free float will improve investor participation and narrow the valuation discount. This remains a uncertainty and likely to depend on market forces.

Another potential risks lies in the majority shareholder. In this case, it is Thai boss, Chaoren, holding a direct stake at 76%. It is of utmost important that the Thai towkay's interests are aligned with minority shareholders.

What are the things the management can do to the detriment of minority shareholders? They can set unreasonably high directors remunerations or, worse still, IPT (Interested Person Transaction) which will solely benefit the majority shareholder instead of all shareholders. I believe IPT risk possibility is low but still it is a risk.

As Warren Buffett said, integrity of management is very important. This is an area which I have to pay attention to.

Conclusion

I believe at current valuation, FCL is attractive, trading at about 35% discount to its book value of $2.15. The portfolio is spread across residential, commercial and hospitality properties in markets such as Singapore, China and Australia which reduces the risk of downturn in any particular country dragging down the whole company. It has a good history of increasing its profits and assets. FCL also has a potential catalyst in the form of REIT listings in the near future,

Key risks like free float and management integrity still remains. The financials of FCL look extremely attractive and there is huge potential upside to go but it also holds hidden risk that goes beyond financial statements.

While many people are proclaiming doom for the real estate, my strategy is to invest at attractive valuation and sit tight to wait for events to unfold. I like to stay invested in good counters for longer period of time. All counters are good investments at the correct valuation.

I came across a recent quote from the papers which best explains my strategy in holding this stock.

"We believe that if you don’t believe in holding a share for 10 years, then don’t even think about holding it for three days… Speculators can still get their thrills through other means. But let’s not make the mistake of confusing investing with gambling"

- Mr David Kuo, Chief executive of Motley Fool Singapore.

Some other guest blogs by Solace in ASSI:
1. King Wan Corp. Ltd.
2. Common Sense Investing.
3. Getting ready for investment.

LMIR: 4Q and FY2013 results.

Exactly one year ago in 2013, I divested a big chunk of my investment in LMIR at 52.5c a unit. At the time, I said that selling at that price meant giving up a distribution yield of some 5.7%. The reason for the partial divestment was the unimpressive performance of the REIT since its rights issue.

Today, one year later, I made my first purchase in an S-REIT since the middle of 2012 as I increased my long position in LMIR, adding a quantum that is about a fifth of what I sold one year ago. So, you can say that, for various reasons, some of which have been discussed here in my blog before, I remain cautious.

At a recent lunch gathering with some friends, when asked, I said that LMIR was still not trading at a price that I would call cheap. Yes, the price I got in today was not cheap but I was looking at a prospective distribution yield of 8.6% which seemed like a fairer proposition compared to 5.7% a year ago but, everything else remaining equal, cheap would mean a 10% yield or higher. Impossible, you think?

When I remind myself that the lowest I paid for LMIR was 18.5c and that I got a huge chunk of rights at 31c, you see what I mean. Prices could plunge again for whatever reason or we could see another rights issue, again, for various reasons.

There was another reason from a FA perspective why I decided to add to my long position. When I blogged about LMIR in August last year, I said that the REIT's term loan maturing this year in June worried me but this concern was addressed when they used the proceeds from the issuance of a 3 year bond to repay the term loan a few months early. This also lowered the REIT's average cost of debt from 6% to 5.3%. A big improvement. Read it: here.

Technically, it also seems to me that the downtrend has been broken and that LMIR's unit price has been consolidating for a while. Of course, no one could tell that unit price has bottomed until after the fact but support seems to have formed at 39c. What is being formed now could be just a floor. We don't know but the momentum oscillators suggested that selling pressure had eased.

Now, the news.

LMIR released their full year results tonight. Here are some of the numbers for 4Q 2013:

DPU: 0.56c
Gearing: 34.3%
Occupancy: 95%
NAV/unit: 41c

The numbers are much weaker than expected. If we were to annualise 4Q DPU, we are looking at a vapid 5.53% distribution yield at 40.5c a unit, my buy price today.

Now, what do we do as unit holders? Press the panic button?

Taking in the bigger picture, what is affecting LMIR's performance in S$ badly is probably the weak Rupiah. However, the Rupiah will eventually bounce back. It always did in the past. In the meantime, the REIT's management will have to hedge the risk.

Looking at the REIT's numbers, it did not do too badly in terms of NPI, reducing 5.5% in S$ terms, thanks to contributions from new properties probably. What really caused DPU to reduce drastically year on year was the 37.5% increase in financial expenses related to the issuance of the MTNs. Now, if these expenses do not recur in the next quarter, then, DPU could improve by quite a bit in the same period.

The next time the REIT has to raise funds could be end of this year or early next year as a $200 million MTN matures in July 2015. So, it is very likely that DPU for the next quarter could be higher. How much higher?

All else being equal, I think that a DPU of 0.66c in the next quarter is realistic. Of course, if the management works hard at bumping up occupancy, DPU could even surprise on the upside. All this is assuming that the Rupiah stays at current levels. Even a slight strengthening of the Rupiah could provide a lift to the REIT's performance.

Of course, there is no saying how Mr. Market would react although a sell off tomorrow would be quite natural. 39c could indeed be just a floor and not the bottom. Next support could be found at 35.5c, the low of 4 June 2012.

See slides presentation: here.
See financial statement: here.

Related posts:
1. LMIR: Divested 42.5% at 52.5c.
2. LMIR: 2Q 2013 DPU 0.93c.

Croesus Retail Trust and Perennial China Retail Trust.

I had a discussion with a friend over dinner last night regarding Croesus Retail Trust (CRT) and why I feel relatively good about it as an investment for income. 

In the conversation, one of the things I did was to compare it against Perennial China Retail Trust (PCRT).

When PCRT had its IPO, I said that only "Red Star Macalline Global Home Furniture Lifestyle Mall, Shenyang, which was completed on 30 Sep 2010 is income contributing at listing date. The rest of the initial portfolio is expected to be completed from 3Q 2010 to 2Q 2014. If we are investing for income, this is not very reassuring."

And I also said that a "distribution yield of 4.88% to 5.51% in the years 2011 to 2012 also does not provide enough compensation for the risks which investors are being asked to bear, in my opinion."
See: Perennial China Retail Trust.

Mr. Market sent PCRT's unit price down 12.86% on its first day of trading from its IPO price of 70c to just 61c. See: PCRT: Weak debut.

Unit price went on a continual decline and was under 40c at one stage. Pua Seck Guan increased his stake while Kuok Khoon Hong and Martua Sitorus became substantial shareholders. I initiated a long position some time later at 47.5c a piece.

"I initiated a long position in PCRT at 47.5c because the distribution yield of 8+% at that price offered a more acceptable level of compensation for the risk I would be asked to assume."
See: PCRT: 1H 2013 DPU 1.9c.

Mr. Market is rather efficient in pricing PCRT's stock. The latest reported NAV/unit is 77c which means PCRT's stock is now trading at a 31.2% discount to NAV! 

Why? Mr. Market has priced in a risk premium.

Although annualising the half yearly DPU of 1.9c will give us a distribution yield of 7.16%, most of the distributable income is from earn out deeds and I highlighted that "current DPU is being sustained by earned out deeds which will be exhausted by end 2014". 

So, what happens then? Income distributions to investors will most probably take a hit. 

See: PCRT: Progress in Q3.

Now, for readers who have been following my recent blog posts on Croesus Retail Trust, they will be able to see the difference I am trying to point out between CRT and PCRT easily. 

CRT's portfolio consists properties which are mature and generating income, all of them. The level of risk which investors are being asked to assume here is very low compared to PCRT's.

Having said this, investing in CRT is not without its risks and I blogged about it briefly before. See: Croesus Retail Trust: Motivations and risks.

I am invested in both PCRT and CRT. So, to some, it might appear silly that I am talking down PCRT but, in my opinion, I am not talking down PCRT or talking up CRT, for that matter. I just say it as it is.

PCRT could do better over time but unit holders must be prepared for a much lower DPU next year as earn out deeds are depleted by end of this year and if the properties completed are not able to pick up the slack fully by then.

CRT offers a much higher level of certainty for the next 2 to 5 years for anyone investing for income and although it is a business trust like PCRT, it is not the same as PCRT. This is why my investment in CRT is about 8x bigger than my investment in PCRT now.

Both PCRT and CRT are business trusts. Same but different. We should not over-generalise.

Related posts:
1. Croesus Retail Trust: What is my plan?
2. Croesus Retail Trust: Overnight BUY order filled.
3. Croesus Retail Trust: Initiated long position at 87c.

How do I view the plunge in the DJIA and what is my plan?

With the recent plunge in the DJIA, some could be feeling unnerved. Unless these people have invested with money they could not afford to lose, there is no reason to feel uneasy or is there?

Well, you know what they say about a market climbing a wall of worries and going down a river of hope. In plain English, it simply means that nothing goes up or down in a straight line.

After hitting a high of 16,576 on New Year's Eve, the DJIA has plunged to 15,879 yesterday. That is an almost 5% retreat. Now, a correction, by definition, could see the index retreat by almost 20%. More than that would be bear market territory. So, 13,260 on the DJIA? Wow!

Intuitively, it seems to me that there would be support at the 14,700 to 14,800 level.  That is about an 11% retreat from the top. Of course, this is just my bowling ball talking to me and it could just be another gutter throw. Always dreaming of strikes, I am.

Let us come back to Earth and see what this tapering business is doing.

Well, it is going to reduce the rate at which liquidity is being added to the economy. Notice that there is no tightening yet. Very important. There is still more money being added into the system but at a slower rate. So, to say that liquidity in the system is being reduced is incorrect and alarmist, even.
 

Then, there is concern that China could be experiencing an economic slowdown and this is also not something new. Plenty of Chinese GDP growth is from a red hot property market. It has been said that this is probably unsustainable.

However, the Chinese government has plenty of reserves and is able to do a lot more, if required. In fact, they just injected more money into the system last week.
 

Of course, people are also concerned about interest rates rising and, maybe, rocketing through the roof. Well, it could happen one day but it won't happen in the near future or for a considerably long period of time.

The Fed has indicated that interest rates will be kept near zero for an extended period unless it sees much higher inflation. We have to remember that the U.S.A. has a gigantic public debt burden and higher interest rates would make debt more expensive for them to service. Why would they want that?
 

Now, if we scale down and look at businesses, do we foresee companies operating as usual? Or do we see them going bellies up? I am sure that some businesses will suffer and talks of how property developers are having a hard time have made their rounds. However, it is also noteworthy that property developers have much stronger balance sheets now, generally. They might not do as well as two years ago but they would certainly still be in business.

Of course, there will be businesses which will still do well, tapering or not. Will the government cancel the plan to double the MRT lines by 2030? Will people stop consuming sugar and palm oil? Will people stop using their credit cards? Will the banks stop lending money? Will companies stop renting business spaces, industrial or commercial? Also, will people stop eating curry puffs? OK, I couldn't resist the last one. My bad.

These are just some questions that I randomly generated and I think it is safe to say that businesses will still be chugging along. A bit slower or a bit faster, they will chug along. Those with competitive advantages or which are experiencing an upswing in their business cycles will probably do better.

However, the same could not be said for their stock prices and this is where we have to remind ourselves of the difference between value and price. As stock prices fall and values remain unchanged, the stocks are becoming more attractively priced.

So, all else remaining equal, a correction is good for investors. In a nutshell, we get to buy more for less.

Of course, the next question is when should we buy?

All of us want to buy at the cheapest. Who wants to pay more? However, I will be quite happy to buy cheaper and, if possible, much cheaper. If I managed to buy something when it was at its cheapest, I would have to give thanks to the Goddess of Mercy or Tua Pek Gong. Maybe, to be safe, I should just thank both.

This is where a little knowledge of technical analysis is useful. I would use it to help decide on entry prices. Very importantly, remember, it is about probability, not certainty.

For example, I believe that banks will do better in an environment where interest rates are higher. So, a correction in their stock prices could see supports tested. Where are the long term supports for DBS and UOB, for examples.

The 100 weeks moving average for DBS is currently at $15.40 and for UOB, it is at $19.80. So, if we should see those prices tested, I could buy some. Some, yes. Pace ourselves. Don't throw everything in, including the kitchen sink. What if the supports broke?

Of course, if we should ever revisit price levels seen during the Global Financial Crisis a few years ago, I hope I would be brave enough to throw in everything, including the sinks (yes, why stop at one) and, maybe, the bathtub (which I do not have). In case you are wondering, chances are I won't be brave enough. Just being honest.

Things could change in the future and it could be things that we have no control over. What is the point of worrying about things like that?

Know your own circumstances and your own abilities.
There are many ways to cross the seas.

What we have control over is to ensure that our investments are fundamentally sound and that they will continue to do what we expect them to do. Since I am primarily invested for income, with a shopping list in hand now, I am quite happy to be paid while I wait.

Related posts:
1. Have a plan, your own plan.
2. When to BUY, HOLD or SELL?
3. Be comfortable with being invested.
4. Be fully invested in the stock market?
5. What should I do when I am down 25%?
(If you can't convince yourself "When I'm down 25%, I'm a buyer" and banish forever the fatal thought "When I'm down 25%, I'm a seller," then you'll never make a decent profit in stocks. - Peter Lynch)